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ABSTRACT
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: WHY GERMANY LEADS AND THE UNITED
STATES LAGS
By
Kristin Kesling
University of New Hampshire, May 2008
Thesis Director: Professor Aline Kuntz

Why is climate change a top priority on the political agenda in
Germany and not a top priority on the political agenda in the United States?
This study seeks to answer this question by examining the evolution of
climate change policy in both countries. Analyzing Germany's and America's
environmental movement, the thesis points to several theories which include
the European Union and cultural values. However, it is the nations' political
structures/institutions and their post WWII foreign policy views that most
determine where climate change policy stands on each country's political.
agenda. The analysis concludes with a possible outlook on America's
environmental leadership.

vii

INTRODUCTION
"If we are to leave our children a world that resembles the earth we
inherited, we must act now," wrote Democratic Senators Barbara Boxer, Joseph
Liberman, and Jeff Bingaman in a November 15th, 2006 letter to President
George W. Bush.' While mounting scientific evidence is revealing climate change
with each passing year (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC,
just released its most adamant report citing 99 percent certainty that climate
change is occurring because of human activity)" the federal government
stubbornly clings to scientific uncertainty, industry-friendly technological
solutions, and is unwilling to implement concrete political actions to combat
climate change and uphold its international obligations.
Meanwhile, across the pond in Germany, climate change is nationally
recognized with concrete political action. As Hans von Storch and Werner Krauss
note in their article, "In Germany, all disastrous weather events are interpreted as
consequences of climate change."1" Why is this so? Tracing the evolution of the
environmental movements in both countries, this study concludes that post WWII
foreign policy views and differences in political structure and party systems are
the key variables in explaining why climate change is a major issue on
Germany's political agenda and not on the U.S. agenda.
The American and European models of government vary in its'
distribution of power. The United States runs on the basis of separation of
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powers, where authority is divided between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. This allows each arm of government to block initiatives of the other
branches if a policy is found unsatisfactory. This results in a slow but transparent
policy process.
In Europe, parliamentary systems are the favored form of government
where political power is more concentrated. While Germany's upper house, the
Bundesrat, can veto laws that it finds unsatisfactory, the power of the executive
branch is vastly different. Whereas in the United States the President is both the
Head of State and the Head of Government, in Germany the President merely is
a symbolic figure that opens parliament and has no real political force. Rather it
is the Chancellor that determines which policies will be on the federal agenda
while maintaining strict control of party members. As a result, if climate change is
on the agenda, they will pass much easier under a parliamentary system than
under a separation of powers system.
In addition, interest groups often have incentives and the political clout to
block/delay climate change policies in America. The two party system in America
pushes out third party influence in Congress, whereas in Germany, under its
multi-party system, a 5 percent electoral threshold allows smaller parties such as
the Greens to enter the Bundestag. While this threshold does filter out more
extreme parties from sitting in Germany's lower house, the presence of the
Green party promotes the other major German party (the SPD) to "green" its
platform by forming coalitions with the Greens to successfully compete for power
against the other big German party—the Christian Democrats.17 Table 1-1, found

2

at the end of this section, compares the American and the German form of
government.
This paper focuses on Germany and the United States because both are
first world nations with federal systems (although these systems are structurally
different), that must deal with many similar issues. There is also a rich level of
detail that emerges in comparing these countries, whose governments have
gone down opposite paths when it comes to climate change.
Climate change policy approaches are increasingly driving the two nations
apart due to a variety of factors. While cultural values contribute to present day
opposing views on climate change policy, it is diverging foreign policy stances in
the post WWII era, national social and party movements, and the institutional
political structures and party systems that allow climate change to remain on
Germany's political agenda while in the United States climate change has yet to
make it onto the national checklist.
This paper presents a literature review of climate change environmental
policy, which states four strong reasons for the diverging approach to climate
change action in Germany and in the United States: post World War II foreign
policy views, social and party movements, the movements' influence on political
structure, and post-materialist cultural values. After analyzing the scholarly
research on climate change policy, the paper discusses the evolution of the U.S.
environmental movement and then outlines the same movement in Germany. It
continues to argue that it is Germany's multi-party system that evolved out of its
social movements and the nation's post WWII foreign policy views that place
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climate change policy at the forefront of the state's political agenda. The study
concludes that despite these differences, the United States may still have the
potential to become an environmental leader in the near future.
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Federal; 16
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Germany
Partial;
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Separation
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President
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This table was largely based on tables found in Raymond A. Smith's The American Anomaly.

United
States

Form of
Government
Federal; 50
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Table 1-1: A Comparison of U.S. and German Democracies
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CHAPTER I

WHY DO NATIONS HAVE DIFFERENT CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES? FOUR
PERSPECTIVES

Introduction
The literature on climate change is vast due to the raging debate over the
scientific ramifications of an altering climate, and stark differences in the
European and United States level of international commitment emerge. This is
especially so since the United States pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. As
a result, the author selects only several key theories toward explaining the
political emphasis of climate change policy in Germany and the United States:
foreign policy views, the evolution of climate change policy during the
environmental movements in each state, the political structures and institutions
that shape policy priorities, and the cultural mindsets of German and American
citizens.
Germany and the United States diverge sharply when it comes to climate
change policy. While many scholars in the field examine these four factors
separately or collectively in groups, they fail in fully integrating these theories to
analyze solutions to bring the United States back to the negotiating table to
address this global issue. The thesis attempts this approach.
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Foreign Policy Views
Foreign policy views play vital roles in shaping climate change policy. This
paper defines "foreign policy views" as 'the position a state takes based on
patterns of behavior concerning international and national interests, a state's
power status, and national perceptions' (K.J. Holsti 1970: 233-309). Robert M.
Berdahl (2006) captures the essence of these components of foreign policy in
German Reunification in Historical Perspective.
Loren R. Cass's The Failures of American and European Climate Policy.
compares the United States and Germany on the evolution of and the response
to climate change. Cass focuses on the international norms that permeate
domestic politics, pointing to numerous obstacles that result, examines the role of
the European Union, and analyzes how national foreign policy views play out in
each state.v
Steven W. Hook and John Spanier's book American Foreign Policy Since
World War II is also an essential source. The authors devote their entire work to
the evolution of American unilateralism since 1945 and how the country's foreign
policy views are increasingly putting the nation at odds with the rest of the world.
This work provides one of the key differences to American and German views on
climate change and gives meat to one of this thesis's main arguments: that
climate change policy is stronger in Germany because of that nation's multilateral
foreign policy views since the end of WWII championed by that nation's political
elites.vi
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The Evolution of Climate Change Policy
How climate change was placed on the political agenda in Germany and
not in the United States is a key aspect to understanding current climate change
policy. A major player in the evolution of climate change policy in Germany is the
Green party. Other publications also analyze the role of the Greens in
environmental policy, such as Andrei S. Markovits and P. S. Gorski's The
German Left Red, Green and Beyond. They list many variables that led to the
rise of the Greens, such as the formation of a hew German class structure,
German post materialism, German nationalism, and many others that made the
Green party so potent. Markovits & Gorski (1993) also examine the Greens
philosophical approach to politics, basing their ethical reasoning on ecology and
nature that led to many industrial chemical bans and an outcry against nuclear
energy.
Andrew Jordan (2005) examines another influential factor contributing to
the rise of climate change policy within Germany that is extending to the rest of
Europe:'The European Union (EU).VM He investigates the different roles that
member states take within the EU in promoting environmental legislation
(whether the states are either "leaders or laggards") as the EU simultaneously
polishes its institutions, rules, and regulations as a functioning entity to include
new members from Eastern Europe. Jordan gives context to the role Germany
plays within a growing "club" that influence national laws and regulations
concerning the environment.
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Due to the lack of national response to climate change in the U.S.,
individual states are taking action to mitigate global warming. Barry Rabe (2004)
provides key examples of smaller, but no less important, steps that American
states are pursuing to regulate the environment. Henrik Selin and Stacy D.
VanDeveer (2007) also point to the workings of powerful networks that are
raising public awareness in American states and are slowly forcing a reluctant
U.S. federal government to address climate change/1" These sources only further
highlight the differences between Germany and the United States in the second
theory of the literature review: the political structures and institutions that shape
policy priorities.
The Political Structures and Institutions that Shape Policy Priorities
Miranda A. Schreurs's Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the
United States is one of the key works in the field describing the differences in
environmental policy outputs in all three states. While there are many factors
influencing policy decisions, Schreurs points to political structures as the main
reason why policies are so different. Outlining the origins of each state's
environmental movements and consciousness, Schreurs examines the role of
interest groups, political parties, domestic politics, and international cooperation
within each state, emphasizing the role international and domestic pressures
played in leading Japan to make the crucial decision to side with Europe and not
the United States when it signed the Kyoto Protocol.
Another of Schreurs's work discusses climate change politics not only at
the state level, but also at the international level with the European Union. Her

9

article entitled Environmental Federalism in the United States and the European
Union'* expands on the legal powers of the EU, of which Germany is a member.
Schreurs also examines the legal channels through which environmental groups
and federal governments use to halt or catalyze environmental action. She
provides key comparisons between the EU and the U.S. federal government in
this work that nicely compliments Jordan's analysis of the EU.
Lyle Scruggs also centers on the role political structures and institutions
play in shaping environmental policy. While Scruggs work is more quantitative
rather than qualitative, he provides definitions of key terms and gives detailed
comparisons of various institutional aspects that are vital to this study, such as
the comparison between pluralist versus corporatist governments, single versus
coalition parties, and the pros and cons of a unified government versus one with
separation of powers.x
In addition, Mancur Olson analyzes the incentives built into the party
system that a pluralist and neo-corporatist states face when trying to win
elections. He compares and contrasts the characteristics of a "winner takes all"
system versus a "narrow distributional coalition" system and how both influence a
nation's economy and its politicians political behavior, providing detail necessary
to understanding how political institutions and party systems work.*'
Finally, Peter Pulzer examines Germany's political structure after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, and how the Green Party evolved from its local roots to the
German parliament, taking necessary votes away from Germany's main party—
the SPD.

10

The Cultural Attitudes of German and American Citizens
Cultural values are the third vital factor that influence citizen thought
processes on climate change policy in Germany and the United States. While
cultural values are not as quantifiable as political structure analysis or analysis of
the evolution of climate change policy, culture permeates all aspects of
policymaking through various means.
One cannot analyze climate change policy within Germany without looking
at the cultural and psychological impact of Hitler's Third Reich. Wulf Kansteiner's
book In Pursuit of German Memory™1 looks at how Nazism influenced all areas of
German life. While this work is not specifically about the environment and climate
change policy, Kansteiner contributes a key angle to this literature review by
looking at a segment of German history that influences the way German citizens
think about world issues today.
Cultural mindsets both in Europe and in America are also shifting due to
the rise of postmaterialism. Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart present
several quantitative analyses of how generational replacement is influencing
social and party movements. They discover that younger Europeans value issues
such as women's rights, self-expression, and environmentalism over national
order and rising inflation—ones favored by older generations of Europeans. It is
issues like these that parties such as the Greens are championing, and the rising
power of its postmaterialist voters is the key reason why the Greens remain in
power today.xm

11

Conclusion
As a result, while the United States pays lip service to climate change
policy and to implementing more efficient energy sources™, these works all
illustrate that strong foreign, political, and cultural obstacles are interacting to
make climate change either a top or a bottom priority on the political agenda
within Germany and the United States. As environmental policy evolved
differently in both nations, so too did state policies concerning future climate
change. The following two chapters will analyze this evolution in detail.
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CHAPTER II

A TIME CAPSULE OF THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Introduction
The United States environmental movement in the 1960's and 1970's was
a powerful wave that instigated numerous changes throughout the country and in
the federal government. Laws such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Act are the
result of the movement's cognitive and environmental impact on the nation, and
large public memberships in environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club
prove that the movement has left their mark on the U.S. citizenry. Today
politicians cannot campaign openly against the environment without losing
credibility and alienating voters. Yet, this revolutionary social movement has lost
much of its momentum since the 1970's, and the U.S. has fallen behind its
European counterparts in implementing environmental legislation. Why is this so
and how does it influence the way climate change is perceived by today's public?
This paper defines climate change as 'the alteration in the composition of
the atmosphere due to the direct or indirect influences of human activity in
addition to the natural variability that occurs over the entire planetary surface
overtime' (Catrinus J. Jempa, Mohan Munasinghe 1998: 2). Historical records
link the human burning of fossil fuels that emits carbon dioxide (C02) into the
atmosphere, and the gradual warming of the Earth, as early as 1896. Swedish
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chemist Svante Arrhenius calculated within a few degrees of modern day
technology the doubling of C02 and the rise in temperature of around 4 to 6
degrees (Donald A Brown 2002: 14). Since then, mounting evidence strongly
correlates the rise of C02 in the atmosphere to increased human activity and
consequently, the rapid climb in Earth's temperatures. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states a 99 percent certainty that climate
change is occurring due to human activity.xv
The United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, of which
carbon dioxide is the most common. Since 1990 C02 emissions increased 18
percent,xvl with the United States emitting 1,526.1 million metric tons in 1999™"
and which by 2030 are expected to rise another 37 percent. With these alarming
statistics, one would think that climate change would capture immediate public
attention in America. Yet, it wasn't until 1958 that the world began taking notice
of the strong scientific correlations between global warming and increased
human activity.
The Spread of Environmentalism
Until the late 1950's, only a small, highly educated segment of the
American population advocated "environmentalism."XVI" It was not until the 1970s
that concern for the environment as a whole spread to the general public (Brown
2002: 15). Although philosophical works from those like Henry David Thoreau
and John Muir expressed the importance of humans' connection with nature long
before the U.S. environmental movement began, it was only when people
commenced experiencing health problems from environmental pollution such as

14

lead poisoning that prompted a rise in public awareness and concern to soar
(Samuel P. Hays 2000: 25, 53).
The U.S. environmental movement began transforming all aspects of
American society. Cary Coglianese defines social movements as "a broad set of
sustained organizational efforts to change the structure of society or the
distribution of society's resources" (Cary Coglianese 2001: 85). The
environmental movement did just that as strong grassroots organizations began
winning lawsuits in U.S. courtsxlx, and the public began demanding cleaner air
and water. Citizens also lashed out against unhealthy industrial practices in the
aftermath of Rachel Carson's publication of Silent Spring in 1962 (Hays 2000:
56-58). The 1970s saw an increase in lead found in the human body all over the
world, and most especially concentrated in first World nations. In addition, as the
amount of toxic waste in U.S. rivers rose, many areas banned swimming and
drinking to curb human health problems (Hays 2000: 53-54). As environmental
concern grew along with the size in membership of environmental organizations
such as the Sierra Club (there were 346,000 members by 1983) and leading to
the creation of new ones like Greenpeace (Coglianese 2001: 93,104), the
environment was permanently placed on the political agenda and began to
transform the U.S. legal system.
By the time Richard Nixon was President, the U.S. environmental
movement was in full swing, leading Nixon to proclaim 1970-1980 to be the
"environmental decade" the day he was officially sworn in (Coglianese 2001: 95).
By 1971, 25 percent of respondents participating in a private White House survey
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placed the environment at the top of their political issue list (Tarla Rai Peterson
2004: 119). Coinciding concern over wetlands, parks, and other forms of
environmental recreation during the previous eight years, 1957-1965, began to
shift toward the negative influences of environmental pollution on human health.
Under strong public demands for federal action to improve the quality of the
nation's air and water since the individual states remained inactive, politicians
began implementing various concrete initiatives™, agencies, and departments,
including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)™ and signing into law the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).™'
The environmental movement itself underwent significant changes. It went
from an essentially grassroots based organization to one rooted in Washington
D.C., lobbying Congress and overseeing the successful legal implementation of
numerous environmental laws (Coglianese 2001:100). Thus, the movement
commenced becoming a part of the traditional American political scene in the
nation's capital with expanding staffs, budgets, and political networks. Some
environmentalists even secured positions in President Carter's cabinet working
for the EPA and the Department of Justice, and they began using the three
branches of government to achieve their goals. Those opposing stricter
environmental regulations, however, also took advantage of the separation of
powers within the government. The "separate but equal" power of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the U.S. government allows each one to block
the other's initiatives and forces them to work together to accomplish goals. This
setup deliberately increases tensions and influences what is at stake for the
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nation's interests™" An environmental lawyer summed up the transformation of
the environmental movement the best when he said, "Before, we filed lawsuits
and held press conferences. Now we have lunch with the assistant secretary to
discuss a program" (Coglianese 2001: 100-102).
Throughout the decade the environmental movement gained momentum
and became more "professional" with its physical presence in Washington, and
national and international concern over climate change began to rise. The
Greenhouse Effect was one of five areas of environmental concern by the 1980's
(D.T. Kuzmiak 1991: 273). Higher quality scientific models predicted dire
consequences for the Earth's population if climate change policy did not take
effect. As U.S. President Jimmy Carter's term came to a close in 1980, a report
issued by the President's Council on Environmental Quality stated that "the
responsibility of the carbon dioxide problem is ours and we should accept it and
act in a way that recognizes our role as trustees for future generations" (Brown
2002: 15-16). However, the wave of federal environmental legislation within the
United States came to an abrupt halt with the swearing in of President Ronald
Reagan in 1981. A review was made of all existing environmental laws amid
scandals at the EPA and Reagan's wish to scale back the size of government—a
major part of his cabinet's political agenda (Kuzmiak 1991: 273).
While Democrats and more moderate Republicans prevented the new
government from repealing existing environmental legislation, President Reagan
cut crucial monetary funds for state environmental programs. This signaled a
major shift in the momentum of the movement, and Reagan's decision made it
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more difficult for states to put these programs into action successfully (Norman J.
Vig, Michael G. Faure 2004: 116-117). The President emphasized scientific
uncertainty to delay any serious political action on climate change despite the
severe drought in the summer of 1988 that renewed national fears surrounding
climate change and ozone depletion.XXIV While in office, Reagan stressed U.S.
economic prosperity over environmental protection, whose measures may be
harmful to industrial production if the environmental dangers were not empirically
well founded.
An Ironic Revitalization
While the Reagan administration sided with the powerful industrial lobbies
throughout the 1980s, more climate change science was emerging to lend
increasingly stronger support that the phenomenon was occurring. On June 23,
1988, U.S. government scientist James Hansen stated with a 99 percent
confidence level that climate change was happening:
Global warming is now sufficiently large that we can ascribe with a high
degree of confidence a cause and effect relationship to the greenhouse
effect... Extreme events such as summer heat waves and heat
wave/drought occurrences in the Southeast and Midwest United States
may be more frequent in the next decade (Brown 2002:17).
This claim is supported by the IPCC's fourth report in 2007 as well as
recent newspaper articles such as one published in the Christian Science
Monitor, stating that 2006 was the warmest in the United States in 112 years—
part of a nine year trend of some of the hottest in the last quarter century.xxv
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Reagan's indifferent response to the environment throughout his eightyear term actually did much to unify the environmental movement. The
bureaucratization of the movement throughout the 1970s made some grassroots
members break away, forming their own environmental causes such as
environmental justice.*00" Environmental justice centers round the tendency for
waste to be dumped in poor areas of the United States where civil resistance
would be low rather than in wealthy neighborhoods where protest would be more
likely to occur. Over time, people living in poor areas are exposed to higher levels
of pollution and potential disease than those citizens residing in richer
communities.
Due to specific causes like these, the movement was very fragmented by
the 1980s. Yet, concern for environmental issues like climate change and toxic
pollution persisted and prompted George H. W. Bush to declare himself the
"environmental president" during his campaign for the White House. Kuzmiak
(1991) catches this sentiment clearly:
Reagan's anti-environmentalism roused environmentalists from the
lethargy they had lapsed into during many of the Carter years and
stimulated renewed citizen environmental activity. The vigor and
determination, which the administration sought to reverse a host of
policies and its open anti-environmental pronouncement, galvanized the
environmental movement into renewed action" (p. 273-274).
Thus, Brown (2002) captures Bush saying:
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Those who think we are powerless to do anything about the greenhouse
effect are forgetting about the White House effect. As president I intend to
do something about it" (p. 17).
President Bush made good on his promise at the beginning. He put acid
rain on the agenda, more environmental restrictions on the Clean Air Act, which
he signed into law in 1990, acquired more land for national parks, and banned
dumping toxic waste into the oceans.*00"1 The environmental movement seemed
able to force the federal government to take action, especially with the muchpublicized Earth Day event in 1990 and its emphasis on anti-waste practices.*00""
The Environment Becomes a Failed Poifcv
While public support for the environment experienced resurgence at the
grassroots level during the 1990's, the response at the federal level lapsed again.
Bush's environmental pledge ended two years later in 1992, when he declared
that "the U.S. lifestyle was not negotiable" at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. The U.S. economy was also in a recession, leading Bush to focus more
on balancing the economy rather than on protecting the environment. Peterson
(2004) clearly describes Bush's altered view at an agricultural meeting in
California:
We cannot permit the extremes in the environmental movement to shut
down the United States on science that may be as perfected as we in the
United States should have it...[We] cannot shut down the lives of many
Americans because of going to extremes on the environment. So that's
my philosophy, and that's what we're trying to do...But we can't do it and
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throw an awful lot of people out of work, especially when it's not based on
sound science (p. 266).
Thus, while President Bush called for increased monetary funds to go
toward more scientific research on climate change,xxlx his political strategies to
curb C02 emissions failed to materialize. At that time, an overwhelming 81
percent of the American public sympathized with or were actively involved in the
environmental movement.50"
By 1992, President Bush was out of office, and in his place newly elected
President Bill Clinton and his Vice President Al Gore stepped into the spotlight for
the next eight years. They had learned that no aspiring U.S. presidential
candidate can explicitly be against environmental protection.500" Al Gore, author
of Earth in the Balancexxx" and a reputed environmentalist in Washington, along
with President Clinton's explicit acknowledgement of the climate change issue,
made many environmentalists hopeful that the movement would regain some of
its 1970 momentum. President Clinton made a strong environmental stand at the
beginning of his presidency, stating at the Kyoto Conference in 1997 that while
the United States made up only 4 percent of the world population, the country
emitted more than 20 percent of global greenhouse gases. Clinton also
conceded that climate change was a real issue that must be dealt with at the
international level with the United States leading the way, and that the nations of
the world no longer could hide behind the excuse of scientific uncertainty.XXXI"
These statements went far beyond his predecessor's, and Clinton even devoted
more attention to climate change in his second State of the Union Address.500™
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Yet, while the Clinton Presidency paid more lip service to the environment and
global warming, when it came time to commit to concrete action, Clinton backed
down in the face of conservative opposition in Congress.
The Hagel-Byrd Resolution of 1997 passed in the Senate with a 95 to 0
vote, rejecting any commitment on the part of the U.S. to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions without Third World nations committed to doing the same. This
made Clinton unwilling to make stronger statements at Kyoto than reductions
already stated in the previous UNFCCC ratified environmental treaty.xxxv Just a
little over 20 years before, Congress was pressured into creating numerous
environmental agencies. Now the conservative nature in Congress returned as
powerful industries mounted expensive anti-environmental campaigns to
convince the American public that U.S. commitments to reducing emissions
would gravely hurt the U.S. economy.XXXVI
There were other signs that environmental attitudes in Washington were
shifting. After the Kyoto Protocol meeting, where the U.S. committed to a 7
percent reduction in emissions, Congress saw any excuse to discuss the Kyoto
agreement as a threat. The EPA, the chief environmental agency created at the
height of the movement in the 1970s, was prohibited from spending federal
dollars to educate the American public about climate change, and virtually
nothing was done to reduce U.S. emissions, which actually rose during this
period (Brown 2002: 37-38). As a result, it is no wonder that, while President
Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, the Congressional hostility the President faced
made U.S. ratification of the treaty all but impossible.
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The Environment on the Backburner
Thus was the political environment when the 2000 Presidential campaign
began, and while George W. Bush pledged to reduce power plant C02
emissions, he clearly echoed Congress's view toward the Kyoto Protocol, and
when Bush became President, climate change was not on the political agenda.
Even public opinion polls reflected the fact that the environment was not a top
political issue, but rather that health care and education had become the primary
concerns. By 2001, the U.S. environmental movement lost much of its
momentum even though 68 percent of the U.S. public still sympathized or were
involved in the movement (Coglianese 2001: 109).
Even the slight verbal commitment President Bush made during his
campaign to reduce C02 emissions quickly melted away (Brown 2002:40). His
new energy policy was also in direct opposition to combating climate change,
predicting a 33 percent rise in oil consumption that would lead to more burning of
fossil fuels. In the words of the President's Energy Secretary "No nation will
mortgage its growth and prosperity to cut greenhouse-gas emissions" (John
Carey, Sarah R. Shapiro 2004: 7). This came in the face of new scientific
evidence from the Academy of Sciences declaring that the climate change
problem would only increase if action did not take place immediately. Although
this elicited more research funds directed toward global warming programs,
President Bush condemned the Kyoto Protocol despite the fact that 61 percent of
Americans surveyed were in favor of the Protocol's ratificationxxxv". The
administration finally withdrew the United States from the treaty all together in
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2001, reflecting the government's long standing unilateral approach in foreign
policy matters (Brown 2002: 41).
Conclusion
Today the environmental movement in the United States, while still strong
at the grassroots level, has failed to initiate aggressive governmental responses
that were observed in the 1970s. While environmental action is increasingly
lagging at the federal level despite politicians paying more positive lip service to
the environment, it is now various American states that are taking up the torch.
While some U.S. states in the Midwestern and Southern regions of the country
are still culturally engrained in environmentally unfriendly practices, states like
California, New York, New Jersey, Minnesota, and the New England region are
quickly becoming the country's environmental leaders (Hays 2000: 25). These
same states, whose inactivity prompted federal environmental action in the
1970s, are now the ones purposely engaged in reducing C02 emissions across
the nation, and who may hold the key to reawakening the environmental
movement within America, prompting the federal government to action.XXXVI"
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CHAPTER III

A TIME CAPSULE OF GERMANY'S ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

introduction
Germany is one of Europe's foremost environmental leaders. In 1995, the
nation committed to cutting down its C02 emissions by 25 percent by 2005, and
by 2000 had already lowered its greenhouse gas emissions by 18.9 percent (Rie
Watanabe, Lutz Mez 2004: 110). Yet the country was not always so
environmentally conscious. Before 1986, the German public paid little attention to
the greenhouse effect, and serious government research on climate change did
not commence until the 1980s.xxxix Even in 1990, Germany emitted the fourth
largest amount of C02 and was one of the most polluting nations in Western
Europe (Watanabe, Mez 2004:109, Cavender, Jager 1993: 3). Change was
underway, however, during the 1970s when the environmental movement was at
its peak in the United States. This section traces Germany's historical
relationship with the environment and most recently with climate change, and
explores the forces that led the environment to become a top issue in the
country.
An Attitudinal Shift
Although the media published occasional articles linking the burning of
fossil fuels to climate change, the 1960s demonstrated relatively little concern
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with the issue in Germany (Jeannine Cavender, Jill Jager 1993: 6). Several
environmental conservation groups had sprung up after WWII and established
branches in the nation, such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1961. These
groups, however, did not have much political clot in getting the environment onto
Germany's public agenda during this time period (Miranda Schreurs 2002: 37). It
was not until the 1970s that these groups grew in influence and political power as
environmental issues flourished alongside the German citizenry protest against
nuclear energy. By 1971, under Chancellor Willy Brandt, Germany created its
first environmental program in the government, where the precautionary principle
(also known as Vorsorge) took root (Cavender, Jager 1993: 7). The
precautionary principle allows nations to proceed with implementing
environmental regulations in the face of scientific uncertainty. Germany
legitimizes many of its environmental security approaches using the
precautionary principle along with other state norms, especially strategies
focusing on crisis prevention.xl The precautionary principle allows nations to
implement more aggressive actions to combat climate change—a concept that
the United States has yet to embrace.
Along with the precautionary principle, the energy crises of 1973-1974,
and again in 1978-1979, also forced the German public to consider alternative
forms of energy, and the crises got the coal industry thinking about possible
solutions to curb greenhouse gas emissions early. In addition, more science was
surfacing about global warming amid mass demonstrations for peace and antinuclear protests throughout the 1980's. C02 emissions were rising and
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essentially "woke up" the German public to the harmful acts they were
committing to the environment when, in 1981, more than half of Germany's
forests were pronounced dead or dying. The death of one of Germany's national
symbols struck a sensitive cultural chord with the people. Three years later,
Germany established a research program to deal specifically with climate change
as the public became environmentally conscious simultaneously as the peace
movement swept the nation (Cavender, Jager 1993: 9), bringing the Green Party
to power (Schreurs 2002: 108-112, 245), in 1983.xli
The Entrance of the Greens
The Green Party is an essential part of Germany's environmental history.
Today the 27 year-old German Green Party is the strongest of its kind in the
world, yet it has undergone numerous transformations to attain its current status.
The Green Party grew out of the wave of environmentalism in the 1960s when
grassroots protests prompted environmental concern at the federal level in both
Germany and in the United States. By 1979, 50,000 citizen environmental groups
existed with membership numbering in the millions, overwhelming Chancellor
Willy Brandt's government (Horst Mewes 1983: 53-55). Amid the fervor, 16
citizen groups came together to form the Federal Association of Environmental
Citizen-Initiatives, or the BBU, in 1972. By June 20th, 1981, the BBU had
obtained half a million members and was taking a very active role in the antinuclear protests that raged throughout Germany's major cities, such as Bonn.
Meanwhile, some of the BBU's founders began discussing the possibility of a
"protest party" that would literally grow out of this huge environmental grassroots
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initiative. By 1977, local German "green party lists" began appearing in the
various regions of the country, such as in Bremen, where in 1979, the Green
Party won over 5 percent of the vote for the first time (Mewes 1983: 57).
Although the Greens soon split after their electoral victory, it was a milestone
nonetheless. These different green state parties eventually came together, and
after a series of meetings to iron out ideological conflict, the federal Green Party
was born on January 13th, 1980.xlii
Building on Its. anti-nuclear and ecological foundations, the Green party
championed alternate and environmentally friendly forms of energy. The Greens
not only worked to change the nation's energy policy, but also to reinvent the
country's social programs, such as a shorter work week, and more pay.xh" The
Greens emphasized global warming as their primary concern during their
electoral platform in 1990, as well as eliminating any products that harm the
ozone layer. These topics were at the center of the environmental movement
within Germany at the time, as the public began to fear the consequences of
ozone depletion when a hole was discovered five years earlier, and the media
commenced printing articles predicting doomsday unless the state took
immediate action.xllv
This fear was reinforced when the nuclear accident at Chernobyl occurred
in April 1986, leading to the creation of the Enquete Commission a year later on
October 16,1987.x,v Made up of scientists and politicians, the commission
released its first report in 1988 warning of the grave dangers of ozone depletion
and the greenhouse effect. The government unanimously voted in favor of the
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report, becoming the first industrialized nation to fully recognize climate change
(Cavender, Jager 1993: 10). Germany also put ozone depletion on the European
Union political agenda when the country assumed its turn at the six-month
presidency (Watanabe, Mez 2004: 111).xlvl The importance of the EU will be
discussed later.
Despite growing public environmental awareness, the Green party's
primary issues contrasted sharply with the other political platforms echoing the
historical events of German reunification on October 3, 1990, and the fall of
communism in the USSR with the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9,
1989 (Markovits, Gorski 1993: 175-176). Instead, the Greens stressed their
party's belief in a return to nature in the form of an Ecotopiaxlv" in the face of an
"apocalypse" of which the nuclear bomb was just one piece supporting the view
that technology was eroding ethical and moral values of the German population
(Markovits, Gorski 1993: 135). The party also emphasized that government
institutional policies and structures reflect more environmentally sound policies.
The results of the 1990 election allowed the Greens to enter the German
Bundestag with 5.1 percent of the vote, giving them eight seats in the
government (Markovtis, Gorski 1993: 233). Four years later that percentage rose
to 7.3 percenf|VI" and from 1998 to 2005, the party increased their electoral vote
from 6.7 percent to 8.1 percent.xllx
As the party began winning federal elections and transforming German
governmental responses to the environment, the Greens have had to equally
evolve themselves. Although the party continually stresses the importance of
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their spokesmen staying in close contact with the grassroots environmental
movement and rebelling against formal party norms with frequent seat rotations
in party leadership, no recruitment, and numerous written requests about
government policies, the Greens have had to adapt to the firmly established
political channels through which German politicians operate (E. Gene Frankland
1989: 400, 402). In short, the Greens have had to "professionalize" by creating
more permanent government staffs and executive departments (Frankland 1989:
407). They have also dropped many of their former aspects of earlier platforms,
such as withdrawing from NATO, and now lend their support for military missions
abroad, such as in Kosovo. Today the Greens boast as their leader Joschka
Fischer, the most popular politician within Germany and one of the most liked
throughout Europe (Claus Christian Malzahn 2005: 1-3).
The Greens still hold firm to their anti-nuclear views, however, as
negotiations over the role of nuclear energy in C02 reductions demonstrated in
1995 (Cass 2007: 141), as well as equal representation of men and women
within the party. The future of the Green party, however, depends on its leaders'
ability to demonstrate that their issues are not just all about the environment, as
the other parties "green" their platforms in efforts to win back voters.1 Yet it is
clear that the Green Party has made its mark on German politics, transforming
the government's aggressive response to environmental issues like climate
change and its ability to influence public opinion.
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The German Citizenry Join In
The Green party did much to educate the German public about the
environment in the 1990s, and with the publication of the Enquete Commission
reports, many German environmental groups such as German Greenpeace
began to join in the fray.1' In 1992, Germany adopted the strictest environmental
laws in Europe under the influence of the Greens (Markovits, Gorski 1993: 176),
reunification, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government, which negotiated with
major German industries to implement numerous voluntary actions to reduce
C02 emissions.1" By that time, the nation was increasing its use of renewable
energy under the Electricity Feed-in Act that would continue for eight years.1"1 In
1998, the Green Party again influenced the German environmental movement
under a new governing coalition that would implement a green tax, a gradual
phase out of nuclear energy, and increase the country's use of renewable energy
sources (Watanabe, Mez 2004: 117).
By 2000, public opinion polls throughout Germany in June of that year
indicated that 98 percent of respondents thought climate change was a serious
problem, with 58 percent expressing more government action to address it (Cass
2007: 192). The National Climate Policy Programme was created to reduce
Germany's C02 emissions by 50 to 70 tonnes in five years (Watanabe, Mez
2004: 118). Two years later in October, amid massive flooding, the Greens
received the largest number of votes ever in its history, making it the third largest
party in Germany (Watanabe, Mez 2004: 120). With this great political boost, the
Greens have been able to lend support for greenhouse gas legislation at the EL)
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level and strengthen the nation's resolve to rely more heavily on renewable
sources. Today Germany is the only country to successfully meet its greenhouse
gas emissions target under the UNFCCC agreement and that is still working with
industry on environmentally friendly legislation.I|V
Conclusion
In the end, Germany has come a long way in its environmental history.
Going from a country whose public was indifferent to the environment, today
German citizens are one of the most highly educated and environmentally
concerned. Due to the influence of the Green party, a string of natural disasters,
and German NGOs involved in environmental legislation at all levels of
government and at the European Union, Germany has become one of the
world's most environmentally friendly nations.17
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CHAPTER IV

WHY IS CLIMATE CHANGE A KEY ISSUE IN GERMANY AND NOT IN THE
UNITED STATES?

Climate change policy development, which here is defined as the
evolution of concrete action proposals to mitigate the speed at which climate
change is occurringlvl, has gone down different paths in the United States and in
Germany. The research question that this thesis seeks to answer is 'why is
climate change a top priority on Germany's national political agenda and not a
top priority on America's national political agenda?' As discussed in the literature,
there are complex reasons why this is the case ranging from varying cultural
perceptions to economic priorities to foreign policy views. Yet, three variables
take precedence over all others because they have the largest influence on
climate change policy. These variables are: 1) Germany and America's foreign
policy views in the post World War II era 2) the social and political imprint that the
evolution of the environmental movement left on Germany after WWII, and 3) the
working dynamics behind a two party versus a multiparty system as well as a
state's political institutions. These three variables shape the national influence of
climate change policy in Germany and the United States and explain why climate
change policy is a number one issue on the political agenda in Germany and not
a primary concern on the political agenda in the United States.
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The three hypotheses are:
•

Climate change policy is stronger in Germany because of the
nation's foreign policy views since World War II.

•

Climate change is a top political priority in Germany and not a top
priority in the United States because of the social and political
imprint the evolution of the environmental movement left on
Germany after WWII.

•

Climate change is on Germany's political agenda and not on the
U.S. political agenda because Germany has a multiparty system
and America has a two party system.

World War II shaped Germany in ways that resonate today. As Kansteiner
illustrates In Pursuit of German Memory, the country struggled with feelings of
moral guilt, shame and responsibility since 1945. This burden essentially
redefined their sense of national identity, and nowhere is it more apparent than in
foreign policy matters. Since the end of WWII, Germany is on a perpetual path to
"normalize" its state through multilateral actions championed by the nation's
political elites. For instance, Germany was soon declaring anti-totalitarianism
during the Cold War (Wulf Kansteiner 2006:184, 206), and the rise of the
German Greens, the most powerful party of its kind in Europe, was due to its
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emphasis on humanitarian and social issues along with their anti-fascism stance
(Kansteiner 2006: 315). Even after Germany was physically reunited after the fall
of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and then governmental^ on October 3,
1990, historians fiercely debated the role Germany played in WWII. Suspicions
rose as to what a reunified Germany would mean militarily for the rest of Europe
(Robert M. Berdahl 2006: 499-500). Berdahl (2006) captures the sentiment in a
quote by a French observer:
Germany, a big nation, is again becoming a great nation....[A]ll it lacks is
the military arm. From the height of its power, its industrialists and
merchants are looking far beyond the West, at the wide world. And France
looks at Germany. It is the season of suspicion—thoroughly foreseeable
after all (p. 499).
Indeed, the "collective shame" that WWII cast upon Germany made the
nation advocate collective security foreign policy views that are reinforced at the
EU level, but are increasingly at odds with America's unilateralist approach.lv"
Until WWII, the United States was reluctant to entangle itself in foreign
affairs (Steven W. Hook, John Spanier 2007: 57). However, this began to alter
after 1945, with the foreign policy stance favoring unilateralism clearly stated in
the Bush Doctrine formed in September 2002. It stresses American hegemony
and any challenge against the status quo as futile and self-defeating. The
doctrine also emphasizes the idea of preemptive war against terrorism using
nuclear weapons, if necessary, abandoning previous U.S. positions on
containment and deterrence (Hook, Spanier 2007: 326-327). This grand strategy
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made the bold assumption that other European nations would gladly welcome
America's foreign policy view. They have not, and climate change policy only
magnifies the foreign policy tensions between Europe and the United States as
Germany and the European Union (EU) go down one path, and the United States
down another.
The influence that the environmental movement in Germany and the
United States left on its citizens is a second vital factor to consider when
examining the political permanence of climate change. The social movement in
America blossomed in the wake of the impassive response of U.S. states to
harmful pollution in local communities. Books like Rachel Carson's Silent Spring
spread public awareness about DDT, and the health consequences due to low
quality drinking water spurred the national government to pass laws like the
Clean Air and Water Act. Soon U.S. environmental standards were the role
model for other nations to follow at the height of the social movement in the
1970's,lvl" as the country experienced an explosion of national laws to combat
harmful pollutants whose legal regulation trickled down to the state and local
levels. While citizen support for the environment remains a permanent factor in
the U.S. social movement, the political momentum of the environmental wave
has stalled in recent decades. This is due to the inability of the national
government to respond effectively to new pieces of environmental legislation
because of its institutional setup, which will be discussed later, and it is now the
state and local levels that are prompting the national government to act on behalf
of the environment.
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The wave of environmentalism in Germany created not only a strong
social movement, but also a powerful party—the Green Party. The post WWII
atmosphere was an ideal setting for the birth of a new political order. As
Germany began redefining its national identity, a party was born to embody all of
its new aspects. The Greens, which grew out of local segments of society,llx
championed alternative energy forms, humanitarian rights, peace, and urged
multilateral action on issues such as ozone depletion. As Green issues became
more popular, which included large measures for environmental protection, the
party gained seats in the German parliament. Since then they have changed the
dynamics of policymaking and have taken away substantial electoral support for
Germany's other major party—the Social Democrats (SPD). This party
movement did not occur in America due to a third vital factor in explaining why
climate change is a number one priority on Germany's political agenda and not
on the U.S. agenda: a state's institutional/political party structures.
The political channels through which groups operate are significantly
determined by a state's institutional setup. Europe mainly runs on a
parliamentary system where power is fused and more concentrated in one office,
such as the Prime Minister. Proportional representation, where parties only have
to cater to a specific segment of the population, permits other political views to
sometimes establish a physical presence in the government. The Greens were
allowed to do so when they met the 5 percent threshold and entered the German
parliament in 1990. This phenomenon is virtually impossible under America's two
party system.
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Scruggs (2003) notes political institutions are "more-or-less formal rules of
representative democracy" (13) that have a profound influence over how
environmental protection laws are coordinated into the domestic realm. While
Scruggs acknowledges that strong factions exist that champion environmental
measures in a single-party system, he demonstrates better response rates of
multi-party coalition governments to environmental problems. This is clearly seen
in the German Green Party and its influence throughout the nation's Lander
(164). Scruggs also recognizes strong differences in policy approaches under a
unified government versus one with separation of powers, where opposing
interest groups can often delay critical action concerning the environment, as has
been evidenced with climate change and the loss of momentum in the U.S.
environmental movement (167-168).
Schreurs (2002) also demonstrates the powerful influence of political
institutions/structures. She convincingly argues that the environmental movement
in the U.S., Germany, and Japan came onto the political agenda at various times
in their history due to the nations' political structures and institutional setup.
These differences provide varying degrees of opportunity for certain domestic
issues to come into the spotlight and onto the political agenda. Schreurs makes
the case that the more parties there are, the more probable issues like the
environment will be put onto the agenda and the more likely concrete political
action will take place. She notes the successful rise of the Green Party in
Germany by 1986, when the party held 7 percent of the vote as the main reason
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why the environment, and in consequence climate change, is a leading political
issue in Germany today.
The entrance of the Greens has altered the political environment in
Germany. Over the last ten years the growing electoral success of the Greens
have eroded votes from Germany's other major parties, especially the Social
Democrats (SPD). Since the 1980's, the Greens have been competing for votes
that until then went to the Social Democrats. As Pulzer (1995) points out, change
was underway for the SPD as early as the late 1970's, when a vast majority of
anti-nuclear protesters in Bonn were formally SPD voters (140). The party soon
spilt as Germany's economy began to suffer, and in 1985 the Social Democrats
and the Greens formed their first coalition in Hesse. Two years later the SPD was
still divided over crucial issues under the Kohl government while the number of
Green voters increased by 2.3 percent (144). Even though the SPD and the
Green party experienced electoral losses during reunification in 1990 (the
Greens did not make it into the Bundestag and the SPD only garnered 24.3
percent in the new Lander (169)) the Greens have since then made a comeback,
winning 16.5 percent of the vote in Bremen's May 2007 election. While the SPD
beat the Greens, earning 16.9 percent of the vote, it is lower than 2003. This is
part of a growing trend, falling not only in Bremen, but also in most regions
across Germany (Judy Dempsey 2007: 1).
Not only are the Greens successfully competing for people's votes in the
current era, but also their growing political power is changing the dynamics of the
party system. The SPD finds itself forming coalitions with the Greens more often
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in order to enter parliament with a ruling majority. The success of the Greens
also makes it easier for postmaterialist issues to flourish vocally and tangibly,
such as securing increased funding for renewable energy sources.Ix
This is not the case in the United States where an entrenched two party
system1* leaves no room for smaller parties in Congress. This is because the
setup does not reward seats based on proportional representation, but rather is
based only on receiving a majority (Mancur Olson 1986:170). It is a winner takes
all system, reaching out to broad interests in society (Olson 1986: 171). This
happened when President Reagan took office—focusing his attention on
boosting the economy rather than on promoting the environmental interests of an
active but slender segment of the American public. While most U.S. citizens still
expressed environmentally friendly attitudes, it was not a primary concern that
affected them personally.
Due to the fact that only two parties earn seats in the American Congress,
supporters of unrepresented interests resort to the U.S. pluralist system. Here
networks compete in lobbying members of Congress. While issues such as the
environment are channeled to politicians in this way, pluralism inhibits
postmaterialism from permeating higher levels of government. This occurs partly,
as Michael Shellenberger and William Nordhaus (2004) argue, because of the
narrow definitions interest groups promote. It is also because strong industrial
lobbies with large monetary resources are able to oppose much of the
environmental legislation that makes its way into the German parliament because
of the electoral presence of the Green party (Schreurs 2002: 88). As a result, the

40

fate of the environment is left in the coercive power of the U.S. federal
government to ensure a certain level of compliance with already existing
environmental legislation. Schreurs (2002) proclaims, however, that the level of
compliance is not uniform across all fifty states. Yet, it is the lack of a formal
'Green' party in the United States that hinders more progressive environmental
legislation from developing.
Thus, most concrete political environmental action must occur at the
lower levels of government because there is no third party acting at the national
level. This, Rabe (2004) argues, is the motivating factor behind the surge in
environmental activism within individual American stateslx". While Schreurs
(2002) argues that there is a minimal amount of federal enforcement, Rabe
(2004) declares that it is the virtual lack of federal environmental legislation in
Congress that is prompting several states to go beyond what is legally required
to curb greenhouse gas emissions and to mitigate climate change. For instance,
the New England region is working with the Canadian government to reach
emission targets set by the Kyoto Protocol despite the U.S. withdrawal from the
Treaty in 2001, and California made a major commitment in 2006 to reduce its
own generated greenhouse gas emissions (that rank 12th in the world) by 25
percent by 2020 independently of the federal government. The California Global
Warming Solutions Act signed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger sparked a
series of political debates around the country due to California's large state
economy.|XI" While some states embrace climate change policy more so than

41

others (a reflection of sub-state cultures), the wave of environmental state action
is a clear sign that climate change is beginning to be taken seriously.
Even major business corporations are becoming "more green" in the face
of increasing state action throughout the country.1™ Indeed, the climate change
'problem' is falling increasingly on the shoulders of policy advocates that make
up U.S. policy networks. As Henrik Selin and Stacy D. VanDeveer (2007) put
forth, it is the climate change action occurring in local businesses, regions, and
U.S. states that is responsible for making the U.S. federal government finally
begin taking up climate change as an issue at the national level (1-27).
This is the exact opposite of what is happening in Germany. The Green
Party is instigating environmental action at the national level that, in turn, is
regulating the various Lander under numerous environmental requirements.
Building on Germany's traditional cultural roots with nature as a defining element,
the national influence of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, and Germany's
distinct social and intellectual history, the Green Party has become a particularly
powerful entity in terms of redefining Germany's social and political policies. The
Green Party grew out of the aftermath of WWII and the Holocaust, championing
everything that was the antithesis of what WWII represented, heavily
concentrating on environmental issues including climate change.Ixv It is to the
immense credit of the Green Party that climate change is considered so highly on
the political agenda in Germany, and it is their very presence in the Bundstag
that makes other political parties and German industry more consciously "green."
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Post WWII foreign policy views, social/party movements, and political
structures/institutions all influence the fourth and final variable this thesis argues
is behind the climate change policy divide in Germany and the United States:
cultural values. As is demonstrated above, WWII filtered out many German
cultural values that predated WWII, especially in the area of national security and
nuclear weaponry. A shift in cultural values led the Green party to rise
successfully to power based on these new values championed in their social
movements. The wave of post-materialism, which was itself an outcome of the
post WWII environment, also altered cultural perceptions of the mass public in
Germany. Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart (1986) empirically
demonstrate how younger European populations have significantly different
values from older generations. They discover that younger generations are more
active in political protests and are likely to support leftist parties that champion
issues such as women's rights and the environment (pp. 2). Abramson and
Inglehart specifically cite the Greens in Germany as a prime example of a party
that came to power largely because of its postmaterialist voters.
Abramson and Inglehart's other works from 1986 and 1997 also
emphasize the importance of generational replacement, especially in Germany.
Tracing two decades of research beginning in the 1970's, they argue that today's
Europeans, although economically sensitive, place more value on issues such as
self-expression rather than on rising inflation. The authors even successfully
refute their key critics who say that postmaterialism is largely influenced by
unemployment and not by generational replacement (1997).
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In essence, Abramson and Inglehart quantifiably demonstrate that cultural
values are changing due to gradual but sustained postmaterialism in the younger
generations of Europe. In Germany alone the percentage of postmaterialists in
the general population experienced a steady growth from the 1970s. The
percentage rose from 10 percent in 1970-1971 to 16 percent in 1982, and when
the Green Party came to power in 1986, 21 percent of the population expressed
postermaterialist priorities. That statistic jumped to 25 percent in the next year
alone. During these same time periods, the distribution of materialists in the
German population decreased from 45 percent in 1970-71 to 31 percent in 1982,
to 17 percent in 1986. While it increased to 18 percent in 1987 and to 21 percent
during German reunification, postmaterialism had by then made its mark on
younger generations of Germans.'™
Their works not only strengthen the role of social and party movements
but also point to the influence that cultural values play in why climate change is a
hot political issue in Germany and is quickly becoming one in the United States.
The EU, in itself a consequence of Germany and Europe's post WWII
perceptions, is adding a whole other dimension to climate change policy. As
Cass (2007) demonstrates, political leaders and national governments are often
persuaded or coerced into addressing environmental protection issues when the
general public perceives certain international norms to be in their interest
domesticallylxvii, and the EU is a tool through which "environmental leaders" are
coercing and persuading other "environmental laggards" to catch up in the area
of environmental protection. The absence of such a powerful player in the realm
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of climate change politics in the United States is crucial to understanding why
climate change is a top priority on the political agenda in Germany and not in the
United States. The EU is essentially reinforcing German multilateral policy
positions that were created after WWII.|XV""X'X. These include collective security
strategies, crisis prevention, and focusing on greater reliance on renewable
energy sources.
Germany is often credited as a "leader" that has shaped EU environmental
policy throughout the decades. As Jordan (2002) declares, Germany, Denmark,
and the Netherlands were known as the "green troika" (49) that pushed
numerous environmental measures onto the EU agenda. The different policy
channels included the EU council of ministers, the EU commission, and various
EU state alliances (52). Germany used all of these pathways to implement
environmental legislation, especially when it was the nation's turn to assume
presidency of the European council of ministers during its six-month rotation
(149). That rotation has come around again to Germany in 2007, and the country
is once more pushing for issues it deems important, and climate change is one of
them. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in Berlin on March 25,
2007, at the 50-year anniversary of the European Union in reference to ratifying a
EU constitution, "We must...renew the political shape of Europe in keeping with
the times. Not to do so would be an historic failure" (Landler, M. (2007, March
26). European Union at 50, Seeks Footing as the World Shifts. The New York
Times, pp. A3).
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Germany is still a major environmental player at the EU level and uses
this institution as another channel through which to promote its political priorities.
For instance, when Germany failed to win crucial U.S. support for its 25 percent
C02 reduction target by 2005 and stabilization of C02 emissions at 1990 levels
by 2000, at the Houston G-7 Summit in July 1990, Germany went to what was
then the European Community (EC) that fall and lobbied for reductions there.
While Germany still met with opposition from other EC members, due to
Germany's persistence, a compromise was eventually reached where the
European Community as a whole would work to stabilize emissions at 1990
levels by 2000 (Cass 2007: 47). In addition, the country holds some of the
strictest environmental standards within its own national boundaries (Jordan
2002: 63).
The United States is not a party to any such organization that must comply
with increasingly stricter environmental regulations, and the EPA is often the
political as well as the legal target of various lawsuits that only weakens its ability
to operate effectively and adds to its already negative reputation in Washington
D.C. There are, however, strong interest group networks operating in the U.S.
pluralist system—networks that are substantially very weak at the EU level. While
the EU has grown in strength and size over the years in fine-tuning its major
institutions, such as the European Parliament (EP), Commission, and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU is still very impenetrable to the interests
of those outside the "exclusive club." Interest groups that have relatively easy
access to inside political actors in the U.S. are virtually left out in the cold when
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trying to lobby at the EU level. This has begun to improve slightly over the years
as the environmental committee on the EP has allied themselves via fluid
networks representing outside environmental concerns (Jordan 2002: 154). Yet,
the EU is also often used as a scapegoat by national politicians when particular
EU environmental directives are found distasteful to its constituents, thereby
weakening the EU's reputation and credibility, much like the EPA on a much
grander scale.
Yet, the EU is a vital force in keeping the environment and reinforcing
agreed upon policies from the post WWII era prominent and visible on its
member states' political agendas. While some states are less environmentally
conscious than others, EU requirements for membership in the increasingly
beneficial and powerful economic trading bloc force many "laggards" to clean up
their surroundings. Even in Germany where the environment is still a powerful
domestic issue kept in place by the presence of the Green party, the EU is
consciously forcing Germany to implement more stringent environmental
regulations as the nation continues to heal from its Nazi past through
championing multilateral views and international cooperation. In addition, the
political competition of the Green Party in Germany is making the SPD have a
"greener" platformlxx. Yet, it is a post WWII Germany with its multilateral foreign
policy views, of which the EU reinforces, the social/party movements, and
political institutional and party structures that are responsible for keeping
environmental and increasingly climate change, on the political agenda.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, climate change policy is a top priority on the German political
agenda and not a top priority on the American political agenda because of the
unique role that WWII played in shaping German multilateral foreign policy views
that is still reinforced today through the European Union, the party/social
movements that resulted since 1945, and each state's institutional structures and
party system. All these variables have come together in Germany, where its
powerful Green party has seized upon climate change as its latest political issue
in its quest to redefine Germany as a globally peaceful nation that continues all
the way up to the EU level. While Germany and the United States both
experienced a wave of environmentalism in the 1960's and 1970's, the
institutional structures and party system that were shaped by Germany's foreign
and domestic policy decisions since 1945 has permitted environmentalism to
survive and to continue evolving national policy. The absence of a past like
Germany's in the United States, its increasingly unilateralist foreign policy view,
and its two party system have made environmentalism at the federal level suffer
in terms of concrete legislation and low levels of American public awareness.
However, times are gradually beginning to change, as a rollover in
governing administrations is on the horizon.lxxl As increasing state action is
occurring in lieu of federal action on climate change, and as more businesses are
seeing the benefits (monetary and otherwise) of going green, politicians in
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Washington D.C. are beginning to take heed of climate change and recognize its
truly global nature. By looking at another industrial nation that has risen to the
challenge of combating climate change in the face of mounting scientific
evidence, America may regain some of its environmental leadership in the near
future that it displayed over 30 years ago.
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